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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
 
In Property Outlaws,
1
 Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal set out an 
ambitious goal.  Challenging both popular and legal assumptions, 
they attempt to reshape the image of those who deliberately violate 
the property rights of others.  The gist of their argument is that these 
lawbreakers are not villains, but heroes—and that this is true regard-
less of whether we consider their actions from a social, economic, or 
legal point of view. 
This agenda is a tall order.  Lawbreakers generally are not a fa-
vored segment of society, and property laws—which provide a deeply 
felt need for individual security—would seem to be particularly impor-
tant to uphold.  Indeed, the overwhelming image of property law-
breakers is negative.  As Peñalver and Katyal acknowledge, a trespasser 
in popular culture and common law is a “transgressor, a law-breaker; a 
wrong-doer, [a] sinner, [an] offender.”
2
 Indeed, “[i]n early modern 
England, landowners frequently left ‘man traps’ and ‘spring guns’ 
along boundary lines to discourage trespass on their lands.”
3
  Al-
though the law might discourage such deadly self-help measures to-
day, the idea that a trespasser is a wrongdoer who gets what he de-
serves is still immortalized in the myths of popular culture and in the 
spirit of the law.
4
 
How, then, can we see property lawbreakers in positive terms?  
Peñalver and Katyal ground their positive view of property lawbreakers 
in the notion that legal reform is a constant necessity.  By their ac-
count, property lawbreakers play “[a] powerful, and at times ironic, 
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role . . . in the process of fostering the evolution of property [law].”
5
  
Although we tend to think of property law as unchanging and forever 
protecting, in reality, property law–-like all law—must be dynamic.
6
  
Social and economic forces continually require us to rethink the col-
lective judgments that we have written into law.  Citing “expressive” 
property lawbreakers, who intend to send a message about the per-
ceived injustice of existing property arrangements (such as Native 
American activists and black civil rights activists who seized property to 
dramatize their views),
7
  and “acquisitive” property lawbreakers, who 
intend to acquire the underutilized land of others (such as home-
steaders in the old American West and contemporary squatters in 
American cities),
8
 Peñalver and Katyal point out that property law-
breakers may in fact be an important force in achieving larger social 
and economic goals that “ossified” property rules otherwise resist.
9
 
Once it is recognized that property lawbreakers may play a desir-
able role, an obvious question arises:  how do we determine which ac-
tivities by property lawbreakers are “positive,” and which are not?  It is 
clear that Peñalver and Katyal do not endow all property lawbreakers 
with this positive cast.  These authors are not anarchists; they recog-
nize that there are distinct costs—in the undermining of the idea of 
the rule of law, and in the demoralization of other property owners 
and aspirants—that follow from rewarding individuals who flout the 
rights of others with new rights for themselves.
10
  The key, then, is to 
distinguish positive or desirable property lawbreaking from that which 
is not.  What precisely, in this context, separates the valuable “wheat” 
from the reprehensible “chaff”?  Since property rights are intended to 
protect all property holdings from external threats, how do we know 
when these threats should be repulsed, and when not? 
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From Peñalver and Katyal’s discussion of positive property law-
breaking, two general justifications for these activities emerge.  These 
are what we might call (a) efficiency reasons, by which property outlaws 
are tolerated because their acts use land more efficiently or inten-
sively;
11
 and (b) rectification reasons, by which property outlaws are tol-
erated because their acts protest past injustice, and there is general 
recognition of the legitimacy of their rectification claims.
12
 
Consider, as do Peñalver and Katyal, squatters who established 
homes in abandoned inner-city buildings in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
adverse possessors who claimed title to vast tracts of land owned by ab-
sentee private and public owners in the nineteenth-century American 
West.  Efficiency and rectification considerations advanced the tolera-
tion of their claims; land which was not being productively used (and, 
inferentially, was owned by wealthy speculators or an indifferent gov-
ernment) was being put to good use by others.
13
  Civil rights activists in 
the 1960s who occupied lunch counters and public buildings received 
widespread support because of the perceived truth of their rectifica-
tion arguments:  the system of legal segregation that pervaded the 
South at that time denied black Americans equal rights to property 
and its benefits.
14
  Widespread public sympathy in 1969 with Native 
American activists who occupied the abandoned federal property of 
Alcatraz Island was due both to the rectification reasons that the activ-
ists advanced (that the land, from a historical point of view, was theirs) 
and efficiency reasons (that the land, having been abandoned, had no 
current useful role).
15
  Clearly, the public’s response would not have 
been the same had they occupied an active federal naval base or the 
public’s favorite national park. 
The descriptions by Peñalver and Katyal of these property law-
breakers and our reasons for tolerating them ring true, and are fasci-
nating reading.  There is no doubt, as the authors point out, that 
property lawbreakers act for both personal acquisitive and ideological 
reasons, and that public toleration of property lawbreaking is 
grounded in both economic models privileging “productive” use of 
land
16
 and public acknowledgment (on occasion) of historic injustice 
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done to particular groups.  There are, in addition, other reasons that 
can be advanced for the toleration of property lawbreakers, as re-
flected in the law of adverse possession.  These include observations 
that third parties should be able to rely on the assumption that the 
occupants of land are titleholders if they have occupied the land long 
enough; and that human beings who have occupied land for long pe-
riods will become deeply rooted in that land and will therefore resist 
dispossession, whether they came by the property legally or not. 
However, as convincing as all of these reasons for our toleration of 
property outlaws are, something still seems to be missing.  Although 
efficiency is important in property arrangements, simple efficiency 
reasons for property lawbreaking are not as powerful as they might, at 
first blush, seem to be.  It is true that property lawbreakers are often 
tolerated when they put land to a better (more intensive) use.  How-
ever, most land could probably be used more efficiently, or more in-
tensively, if nonowners were given the chance.  Farm fields could be-
come home sites, and private woods could become parks. Yet we do 
not allow this.  In fact, efficiency arguments for property lawbreaking 
are very selectively honored. 
The same is true for rectification claims for prior social and eco-
nomic injustices.  Not all groups who have experienced injustice are 
legitimate candidates for tolerated property lawbreaking in the public 
mind.  For instance, most observers would probably place the griev-
ances of Japanese Americans interned during World War II into a dif-
ferent, monetarily compensable category.  One cannot imagine tre-
mendous public sympathy if these victims or their descendants 
illegally occupied public or private land to dramatize their claims, 
however just their arguments.  So, what is this additional element—in 
addition to efficiency and rectification reasons—that pushes us to 
sympathize with property lawbreakers and to selectively tolerate their 
claims?  Peñalver and Katyal hint at what this might be.  Intentional 
property lawbreaking, they write, is “a strategy employed by those who 
cannot afford to file civil suits or whose voice in the legislative process 
is too weak to attract the attention of lawmakers.”
17
  It is appealing “to 
the powerless and [the] marginal.”
18
  It is “a tool of the little people—
of the ‘have-nots.’”
19
  It is used by “those [who are] disenfranchised by 
 
17
Id. at 1100. 
18
Id. at 1101. 
19
Id. 
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the existing property system,” and who “flout[] the law in hopes of 
achieving their goals.”
20
 
We thus have two different observations, juxtaposed.  First, prop-
erty lawbreakers are more tolerated in actuality than property laws 
and the mythology of their protection would predict.  Second, those 
who engage in tolerated property lawbreaking are often the disen-
franchised, the propertyless, the “have-nots” in the property world. 
At this point we must pause.  Are these simply two unrelated ob-
servations?  Or does this mean that we (as a society) tolerate property 
lawbreaking because the lawbreakers are those who are losers under 
the existing regime of property and entitlements, while the targeted 
owners are winners under the same regime?  Put another way, do we 
have different ideas about the protection that property should afford, 
depending on the identities of the wrongdoers and the titleholders? 
The claim that the identities of the property wrongdoers or title-
holders affect the outcome of property lawbreaking cases is clearly not 
true across the board.  For instance, a boundary encroacher can ob-
tain title through adverse possession whether the encroacher is penni-
less or rich, or whether the titleholder owns a thousand acres or one.  
Indeed, Peñalver and Katyal are very cautious in their possible en-
dorsement of identity attitudes, even as they point out hints of such 
notions in popular culture and law.
21
  For instance, we generally be-
lieve that those who steal to survive without threatening the lives of 
others are less culpable than other, more menacing criminals,
22
 and 
the philosophical antecedents of Western, liberal democratic law in-
clude acknowledgment of the duty of the rich to share with the poor.
23
 
Why are Peñalver and Katyal so cautious?  Why do they seemingly 
feel the need, for instance, to camouflage rawly redistributive notions 
in less controversial theories, such as a desire to enhance social pro-
ductivity or to facilitate “involuntary transfers . . . when there is reason 
to believe that the lawbreaker places a higher value on the prop-
erty . . . than the true owner” does?
24
 
In this caution, of course, Peñalver and Katyal are not alone.  All 
of us writing in the field of property law and theory are reticent to 
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24
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champion broadly redistributive notions, or (in this context) to imply 
that property protection afforded by law depends on the “wealth iden-
tities” of either the property lawbreaker or titleholder.  We want, after 
all, to be heard, not offhandedly dismissed.  And, as Peñalver and 
Katyal note, an argument that the rights of property lawbreakers or 
titleholders should be grounded in their economic status “sounds 
fairly radical in the abstract.”
25
 
The underlying problem that theorists and others face is that 
property embodies a deep and inherent paradox.  On the one hand, 
property by its very nature embodies conscious, brutal, distributive deci-
sions.
26
  When we are considering the fate of external, physical, finite 
resources, such as land and all that it yields, property is a zero-sum 
game.  If we acknowledge the “rights” of some individuals in these re-
sources, we deny the “rights” of others.  When we decide (and decide 
we must) who owns a building, who will farm the land, and whose 
mouths are fed, we are making distributive decisions, whether we like 
it or not.  Property law design and enforcement cannot avoid this.  It 
is a continual process of serious, deliberate, distributional decision 
making. 
And yet—and here is the paradox—protection is also the essence 
of property.  The promise of property law, and its critical social func-
tion, is to protect what it identifies as ours.  Whatever the distributional 
fairness or unfairness that may exist, whatever the vagaries of the mo-
ment, property law promises that entitlements will not change.  If I 
own a building, or I own land, I assume that it is mine.  And this is 
true regardless of my needs relative to those of others.  There are se-
curity, stability, and incentives to invest that are promised by these 
laws. 
The genius of Property Outlaws is that it presents this paradox in a 
context that all of us recognize, and in a way that makes it real.  Each 
of us knows of the power and sanctity of rights, titles, and other legal 
emoluments.  We think far less, on a daily basis, about when and how 
all of these assumptions must yield.  Property Outlaws reminds us of 
how we, as a society, accept, on some deep level, the reality of both 
notions.  In addition, by so vividly portraying our past actions, it also 
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shows us that we can afford (perhaps) to be more giving to the poor 
and dispossessed among us than we might otherwise suppose. 
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